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ABSTRACT
The LOCKSS project has developed and deployed in a world-
wide test a peer-to-peer system for preserving access to jour-
nals and other archival information published on the Web.
It consists of a large number of independent, low-cost, per-
sistent web caches that cooperate to detect and repair dam-
age to their content by voting in “opinion polls.” Based on
this experience, we present a design for and simulations of a
novel protocol for voting in systems of this kind. It incorpo-
rates rate limitation and intrusion detection to ensure that
even some very powerful adversaries attacking over many
years have only a small probability of causing irrecoverable
damage before being detected.
$Id: SOSP2003-long.tex,v 1.19 2003/10/17 03:40:01 maniatis Exp $
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.7 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Digital Li-
braries; D.4.5 [Operating Systems]: Reliability
General Terms
Design, Economics, Reliability
Keywords
Replicated storage, rate limiting, digital preservation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Academic publishing is migrating to the Web [27], forcing
the libraries that pay for journals to transition from pur-
chasing copies of the material to renting access to the pub-
lisher’s copy [22]. Unfortunately, rental provides no guaran-
tee of long-term access. Librarians consider it one of their
responsibilities to provide future readers access to important
materials. With millennia of experience with physical doc-
uments, they have techniques for doing so: acquire lots of
copies of the document, distribute them around the world,
and lend or copy them when necessary to provide access.
∗This is an extended version of a shorter conference pa-
per [25].
†Now with Intel Research, Berkeley, CA.
‡Now with Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
§Now with HP Labs, Palo Alto, CA.
In the LOCKSS1 program (Lots Of Copies Keep Stuff
Safe), we model the physical document system and apply
it to Web-published academic journals, providing tools for
libraries to take custody of the material to which they sub-
scribe, and to cooperate with other libraries to preserve it
and provide access. The LOCKSS approach deploys a large
number of independent, low-cost, persistent web caches that
cooperate to detect and repair damage by voting in “opin-
ion polls” on their cached documents. The initial version
of the system [32] has been under test since 1999 at about
50 libraries world-wide, and is expected to be in production
use at many more libraries in 2004. Unfortunately, the pro-
tocol now in use does not scale adequately, and analysis of
the first design for a revised protocol [26] showed it to be
insufficiently resistant to attack.
In this work, we present a design for and simulations of a
new peer-to-peer opinion poll protocol that addresses these
scaling and attack resistance issues. We plan to migrate it
to the deployed system shortly. The new protocol is based
on our experience with the deployed LOCKSS system and
the special characteristics of such a long-term large-scale
application. Distributed digital preservation, with its time
horizon of many decades and lack of central control, presents
both unusual requirements, such as the need to avoid long-
term secrets like encryption keys, and unusual opportunities,
such as the option to make some system operations inher-
ently very time-consuming without sacrificing usability.
Digital preservation systems must resist both random fail-
ures and deliberate attack for a long time. Their ultimate
success can be judged only in the distant future. Techniques
for evaluating their design must necessarily be approximate
and probabilistic; they share this problem with encryption
systems. We attempt to evaluate our design in the same
way that encryption systems are evaluated, by estimating
the computational effort an adversary would need to achieve
a given probability of the desired result. In an encryption
system, the desired result is to recover the plaintext. In our
case, it is to have the system deliver a corrupt copy of a
document. These estimates can be converted to monetary
costs using technology cost curves, and thus compared to
the value of the plaintext or document at risk.
We introduce our design principles and the deployed test
system, then describe our new protocol and the reasons for
1LOCKSS is a trademark of Stanford University.
1
the design decisions we made. We analyze some attacks
its adversary can mount, then describe simulations of the
system and three types of such attack, aimed at undetected
direct corruption of a document, at discrediting the system
by causing alarms, and at slowing the system down.
Our simulations show a system that resists for decades an
adversary capable of unlimited sustained effort, by prevent-
ing him from applying effectively more effort to the system
than his victims do. Even assuming that an implementation
flaw hands an adversary instantaneous control of one-third
of the peers, his sustained effort can increase the probability
of a reader seeing a damaged copy by no more than a further
3.5%, in the worst case. The system has a high probability
of detecting an attack that can cause permanent damage be-
fore that damage becomes irreversible, while producing very
few false positives due to random faults.
We believe this protocol and its underlying principles are
novel and will prove useful in the design of other long-term
large-scale applications operating in hostile environments.
2. DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Digital preservation systems have some unusual features.
First, such systems must be very cheap to build and main-
tain, which precludes high-performance hardware such as
RAID [29], or complicated administration. Second, they
need not operate quickly. Their purpose is to prevent rather
than expedite change to data. Third, they must function
properly for decades, without central control and despite
possible interference from attackers or catastrophic failures
of storage media such as fire or theft. These features, com-
bined with our experience building and maintaining other
large-scale distributed systems, lead to the very conserva-
tive design principles we use:
Cheap storage is unreliable. We assume that in our time-
scale no cheap and easy to maintain storage is reliable [9].
Note that write-once media are at least as unreliable as
disks, eliminating alternate designs dependent on storing
documents or their hashes on CD-R (in our current deploy-
ment the CD-R containing the peer software is the cause of
the vast majority of errors).
No long-term secrets. Or, to quote Diffie [13], “The se-
cret to strong security: less reliance on secrets.” Long-term
secrets, such as private keys, are too vulnerable for our ap-
plication. These secrets require storage that is effectively
impossible to replicate, audit, repair or regenerate. Over
time they are likely to leak; recovering from such leakage is
extraordinarily difficult [11, 37].
Use inertia. The goal of a digital preservation system is to
prevent change. Some change is inevitable, and the system
must repair it, but there is never a need for rapid change.
A system that fails abruptly, without warning its operators
in time for them to take corrective action and prevent total
failure [35], is not suitable for long-term preservation. Rate
limiting has proved useful in other areas [39]; we can exploit
similar techniques because we have no need for speed.
Avoid third-party reputation. Third-party reputation in-
formation is subject to a variety of problems, especially in
the absence of a strong peer identity. It is vulnerable to slan-
der and subversion of previously reliable peers. If evidence
of past good behavior is accumulated, an attacker can “cash
in” a history of good behavior in low-value interactions by
defecting in a single high-value interaction [40].
Reduce predictability. Attackers predict the behavior of
their victim to choose tactics. Making peer behavior de-
pend on random combinations of external inputs and inter-
nal state reduces the accuracy of these predictions.
Intrusion detection is intrinsic. Conventional intrusion
detection systems are extrinsic to the application being pro-
tected. They have to operate with less than full information
about it, and may themselves become a target. Systems with
bimodal behavior [4] can provide intrinsic intrusion detec-
tion by surrounding good states with a “moat” of forbidden
states that are almost never reachable in the absence of an
attack, and that generate an alarm.
We believe this mechanism to be fundamentally more ro-
bust than layering an intrusion detection system on top of
an application; it does however share with conventional in-
trusion detection systems the notion that repelling attacks
on the system must be a cooperative effort between the soft-
ware and the humans responsible for it.
Assume a strong adversary. The LOCKSS system pre-
serves e-journals that have intrinsic value and contain infor-
mation that powerful interests might want changed or sup-
pressed. Today, a credible adversary is an Internet worm
whose payload attacks the system using tens of thousands
of hosts. We must plan for future, more powerful attacks.
The LOCKSS design is very conservative, appropriately
so for a preservation system. Our goal is to apply these
principles to the design to achieve a high probability that
even a powerful adversary fails to cause irrecoverable dam-
age without detection.
3. THE EXISTING LOCKSS SYSTEM
The LOCKSS system models librarians’ techniques for
physical documents to preserve access to e-journals, by mak-
ing it appear to a library’s patrons that pages remain avail-
able at their original URLs even if they are not available
there from the publisher. We thus preserve access to the
material via common techniques such as links, bookmarks,
and search engines. To do this, participating libraries run
persistent web caches that:
• collect by crawling the journal web-sites to pre-load
themselves with newly published material,
• distribute by acting as a limited proxy cache for the
library’s local readers, supplying the publisher’s copy
if it is available and the local copy otherwise,
• preserve by cooperating with other caches that hold
the same material to detect and repair damage.
Caches cooperate by participating in “opinion polls” in a
peer-to-peer network. In each, a sample of peers votes on
the hash of a specified part of the content.
Polls provide peers with confidence in content authentic-
ity and integrity. Journal publishers do not currently sign
the material they distribute, they do not provide a mani-
fest describing the files forming a given paper, issue or vol-
ume, and the crawling process is unreliable. Furthermore,
no completely reliable long-term storage medium is avail-
able. Catastrophic failures such as fire, theft, and hacker
break-in can wipe out or alter any storage medium without
possibility of recovery. Evidence that many peers indepen-
dently obtained and agree with each other on the material
is the best available guarantee that content is authentic and
correctly preserved.
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Peers vote on large archival units (AUs), normally a year’s
run of a journal. Because each peer holds a different set of
AUs, the protocol treats each AU independently. If a peer
loses a poll on an AU, it calls a sequence of increasingly spe-
cific partial polls within the AU to locate the damage. Other
peers cooperate with the damaged peer if they remember it
agreeing with them in the past about the AU, by offering it
a good copy, in the same way they would for local readers.
This mechanism defends against two important problems
endemic to peer-to-peer systems: free-loading and theft. First,
the only benefit a peer obtains from the system is a repair,
and to obtain it the peer must have participated in the past,
which precludes free-loading. Second, a peer only supplies
material to a peer that proved in the past that it had that
material, so the system does not increase the risk of theft.
In this way LOCKSS peers provide a distributed, highly
replicated, self-healing store of data that does not materi-
ally increase the risks that publishers already run. This is
important; under the DMCA [19] publishers must give per-
mission for libraries to preserve their material.
Library budgets are perennially inadequate [3]. To be ef-
fective, any digital preservation system must be affordable
in the long term. Minimizing the cost of participating in
the LOCKSS system is essential to its success, so individ-
ual peers are built from low-cost, unreliable technology. A
generic PC with three 180GB disks currently costs under
$1000 and would preserve about 210 years of the largest jour-
nal we have found (the Journal of Biological Chemistry) for
a worst-case hardware cost of less than $5 per journal/year.
This is equivalent to less than 1¢ per SOSP proceedings.
Using these generic PCs we can build a system with ac-
ceptable performance. If peers check each AU every three
months and split their time equally between calling polls
and voting in polls called by others, each peer has 45 days
in which to call one poll for each of its AUs. If there are
210 AUs, each poll should last about 5 hours. With our new
protocol, this size of AU costs the caller about 1040 seconds
for each peer it invites to vote (Section 6.1). Each poll could
thus involve about 17 peers, more than in the current tests.
Peers require little administration [31], relying on cooper-
ation with other caches to detect and repair failures. There
is no need for off-line backups on removable media. Creating
these backups, and using them when readers request access
to data, would involve excessive staff costs and latencies be-
yond a reader’s attention span [36].
4. THE NEW OPINION POLL PROTOCOL
In this section we outline, describe and justify our new
LOCKSS opinion poll protocol. We give an overview of the
protocol and introduce relevant apparatus and notation be-
fore specifying the protocol in more detail in Section 4.1. In
Section 4.2, we distill the main techniques we employ in our
design and explain how and why the protocol applies them.
To simplify the analysis of the new protocol, we abstract
the relevant features of the existing system. We consider a
population of peers preserving a copy of a single AU, ob-
tained from a publisher who is no longer available. We ig-
nore the divide-and-conquer search for damage in a real,
multi-file journal. Each peer uses one of a number of inde-
pendent implementations of the LOCKSS protocol to limit
common-mode failures. Each peer’s AU is subject to the
same low rate of undetected random damage.
While a peer is any node that participates with benign
or malicious intent in the LOCKSS protocol, we make the
following distinctions between different types of peers in the
rest of this paper:
• A malign peer is part of a conspiracy of peers attempt-
ing to subvert the system.
• A loyal peer is a non-malign peer, i.e., one that follows
the LOCKSS protocol at all times.
• A damaged peer is a loyal peer with a damaged AU.
• A healthy peer is a loyal peer with the correct AU.
The overall goal of our design is that there be a high
probability that loyal peers are in the healthy state despite
failures and attacks, and a low probability that even a pow-
erful adversary can damage a significant proportion of the
loyal peers without detection.
A LOCKSS peer calls opinion polls on the contents of an
AU it holds at a rate much greater than any anticipated rate
of random damage. It invites into its poll a small subset
of the peers it has recently encountered, hoping they will
offer votes on their version of the AU. Unless an invited
peer is busy, it computes a fresh digest of its own version
of the AU, which it returns in a vote. If the caller of the
poll receives votes that overwhelmingly agree with its own
version of the AU (a landslide win), it is satisfied and waits
until it has to call a poll again. If it receives votes that
overwhelmingly disagree with its own version of the AU (a
landslide loss), it repairs its AU by fetching the copy of a
voter who disagreed, and re-evaluates the votes, hoping now
to obtain a landslide win for its repaired AU. If the result
of the poll justifies neither a landslide win nor a landslide
loss (an inconclusive poll), then the caller raises an alarm
to attract human attention to the situation.
The protocol supports two roles for participating peers
(see Section 4.1). First, the poll initiator calls polls on its
own AUs and is the sole beneficiary of the poll result. Sec-
ond, the poll participant or voter is a peer who is invited
into the poll by the poll initiator and who votes if it has
the necessary resources. A voter need not find out the re-
sult of a poll in which it votes. Poll participants for a given
poll are divided into two groups: the inner circle and the
outer circle. Inner circle participants are chosen by the poll
initiator from those peers it has already discovered. The
initiator decides the outcome of the poll solely on inner cir-
cle votes. Outer circle participants are chosen by the poll
initiator from peers nominated by inner circle voters. The
initiator uses outer circle votes to perform discovery, i.e., to
locate peers that it can invite into future inner circles for its
polls.
LOCKSS peers communicate in two types of exchanges
(see Section 4.1). First, a poll initiator uses unicast data-
grams to communicate with the peers it invites to arrange
participation and voting in the poll. Second, a poll initiator
may contact its voters to request a repair for its AU using
a bulk transfer protocol. In both cases, communication is
encrypted via symmetric session keys, derived using Diffie-
Hellman key exchanges [14] between the poll initiator and
each of its participants. After the poll, session keys are dis-
carded. Figure 1 shows a typical message exchange between
a poll initiator and its inner and outer circles.
The LOCKSS opinion poll protocol requires both poll
initiators and voters to expend provable computational ef-
fort [18] in amounts related to underlying system operations
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(hashing of an AU), as a means of limiting Sybil attacks [16].
We describe in Section 4.2.1 how these amounts are deter-
mined, and how proofs of effort are constructed, verified,
and used. In the protocol description below we simply refer
to the generation and verification of effort proofs.
In the remainder of this paper we use the following nota-
tion for system parameters:
A Maximum number of discredited challenges allowed in a
poll (Section 4.1.2)
C Proportion of the reference list refreshed using friends at
every poll (churn factor in Section 4.1.8)
D The maximum number of votes allowed to be in the mi-
nority of a poll (Section 4.1.6)
E Maximum age of unused reference list entries (Section 4.1.8)
I Number of outer circle nominations per inner circle par-
ticipant (Section 4.1.10)
N Number of inner-circle peers invited into a poll (Sec-
tion 4.1.2)
Q Number of valid inner-circle votes required to conclude a
poll successfully (quorum) (Section 4.1.2)
R Mean interval between two successive polls called by a
peer on the same AU (Section 4.1.1)
and for convenience variables:
L Number of loyal voters in the inner circle (Section 5.4.1)
M Number of malign voters in the inner circle (Section 5.4.1)
V Number of inner-circle peers whose vote is received and
verified to be valid (Section 4.1.6)
4.1 Detailed Description
In this section, we present in detail how the opinion poll
protocol works. In Section 4.2, we explain the reasoning
behind our major design decisions.
Each peer maintains two peer lists for every AU it holds:
the reference list, which contains information about other
LOCKSS peers it has recently encountered; and the friends
list, which contains information about LOCKSS peers with
whose operators or organizations the peer has an out-of-
band relationship. A peer maintains for every AU it holds
a poll counter that records the number of polls the peer has
called on that AU since first acquiring it.
Reference list entries have the form [peer IP address, time
inserted ]. They are added to or removed from the list by
the protocol. The value of the time inserted field is set to
the value of the poll counter at the time the entry is inserted
into the reference list. Friends list entries contain only a peer
IP address. They are added to or removed from the list by
the peer’s operator, as his affiliations with other institutions
change over time.
A peer who is not in the process of calling a poll for an AU
also maintains a refresh timer for that AU. When the timer
expires, the peer calls a new poll for the AU (Section 4.1.2).
In what follows, we describe in detail the different proto-
col steps, including bootstrapping (Section 4.1.1), the poll
initiator’s point of view (Sections 4.1.2 to 4.1.8) and the poll
participant’s point of view (Sections 4.1.9 to 4.1.12).
Poll
PollProof
Nominate
Vote Poll
PollChallenge
PollProof
Nominate
Vote
InitiatorInner Outer
RepairRequest
Repair
4.1.9
4.1.10
4.1.11
4.1.12
4.1.2
4.1.3
PollChallenge
4.1.4
4.1.9
4.1.10
4.1.11
4.1.3
4.1.5, 4.1.6
4.1.7
4.1.8
4.1.4
Figure 1: The protocol messages exchanged during a
poll between the poll initiator and poll participants.
Time flows from top to bottom. Next to each phase
in the execution of the protocol, we give the section
number that provides the pertinent description.
4.1.1 Bootstrapping
When a peer first enters a LOCKSS network for a given
AU, or when it reinitializes after a failure, it copies all entries
from its current friends list into its reference list, and sets
its refresh timer with a random expiration time with mean
value R. In our simulations, we choose this random value
uniformly from an interval centered at R.
4.1.2 Poll Initiation
To call a new poll on an AU, a LOCKSS peer chooses
a fresh, random poll identifier and N random peers from
its reference list, which it inserts into its inner circle list.
For each inner circle peer, the poll initiator chooses a fresh,
random Diffie-Hellman public key, and sends that peer a Poll
message, of the form [Poll ID, DH Public Key ]. Then the
initiator waits for PollChallenge messages from the invited
inner circle peers (see Section 4.1.9) and sets a challenge
timer to stop waiting.
The initiator removes from its inner circle list those peers
who respond with a negative PollChallenge message, those
who do not respond by the time the challenge timer expires,
and those from whom the initiator receives multiple PollChal-
lenge messages with conflicting contents.
Peers removed because of conflicting PollChallenge mes-
sages are said to be discredited. A discredited peer may
be self-inconsistent because of a local fault; alternatively, it
may be the victim of a spoofer located near it or near the
poll initiator. Either way, the initiator cannot tell the in-
tended from the faulty or malicious PollChallenge messages,
so it removes discredited peers from the poll. If the initiator
discredits more than A peers in a poll, it suspects a local
spoofer and raises a spoofer alarm (see Section 4.1.13).
For all inner circle peers who send a valid, affirmative
challenge, the initiator computes the provable effort for its
poll invitation (Section 4.1.3). If the initiator ends up with
fewer inner circle peers than Q, the minimum required, it
invites additional peers into the poll via more Poll messages,
or aborts the poll if it has no more peers in its reference list.
4.1.3 Poll Effort
For every received affirmative PollChallenge message, the
initiator produces some computational effort that is prov-
able via a poll effort proof (see Section 4.2.1). The effort
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and its proof are cryptographically derived from the poll
identifier and the potential voter’s challenge. The initiator
returns this poll effort proof to the sender of the associated
PollChallenge message within a PollProof message of the form
[Poll ID, poll effort proof ], encrypted using the session key.
The initiator also sends PollProof messages to poll partici-
pants who responded to the initial invitation with a negative
PollChallenge. The initiator need not expend computational
effort for negative challenges; it can use a random value as
the poll effort proof (see Section 4.2.5).
After sending all PollProof messages, the initiator waits for
Nominate messages (Section 4.1.10) and sets the nomination
timer to stop waiting. When all Nominate messages arrive
or the timer expires, the initiator forms its outer circle.
4.1.4 Outer Circle Invitation
The initiator discovers new peers that maintain the same
AU by forming an outer circle based on the Nominate mes-
sages returned from its inner circle poll participants (Sec-
tion 4.1.10). Discovery is important when the reference list
is short (close to N), but less necessary when the reference
list is long. Therefore, the initiator picks an outer circle size
that, when added to its current reference list, would achieve
a target reference list size (in our simulations 3×N).
To form its outer circle, the initiator removes from every
nomination list peers already contained in its reference list,
and then it chooses an equal number of peers from every
nomination list at random for its outer circle list ; as a result,
every inner circle nominator affects the outer circle equally.
The initiator invites outer circle peers into the poll in a
manner identical to inviting the inner circle, as outlined in
Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. Nominate messages from outer circle
participants are ignored.
The initiator starts collecting Vote messages once it has
sent its inner circle PollProof messages (Section 4.1.3). As
soon as it finishes the construction of poll effort proofs for
the outer circle, it sets a vote timer to stop collecting Vote
messages. When all expected Vote messages have arrived, or
the vote timer has expired, the initiator verifies the votes.
4.1.5 Vote Verification
Vote verification deems votes to be one of invalid, valid
but disagreeing with the initiator’s AU, or valid but agree-
ing with the initiator’s AU. Votes are constructed in rounds
(Section 4.1.11) and are thus verified in rounds.
In each such round, the initiator verifies the proof of com-
putational effort included in the Vote message for the corre-
sponding voting round. If the proof is incorrect, the initia-
tor deems the vote invalid and verification stops. Otherwise,
if the vote has yet to be deemed disagreeing, the initiator
hashes the proof with the corresponding portion of its own
copy of the AU; if the result does not match the hash in the
vote, the vote is declared disagreeing. The initiator skips
hashing the AU if it has already deemed the vote disagree-
ing and uses the values in the Vote message to proceed with
validity verification, instead.
If all proofs of effort are correct, the initiator deems the
vote valid. If all AU hashes match, the initiator deems the
vote agreeing, and disagreeing otherwise. Invalid votes re-
sult in the removal of the offending voter from the poll (inner
or outer circle), and from the initiator’s reference list, since
they indicate fault or malice. When the initiator has verified
all received Vote messages, it tabulates the results.
4.1.6 Vote Tabulation
The poll initiator tabulates the valid votes from the inner
circle to determine whether its AU replica is correct. If the
number V of valid inner circle votes is greater than or equal
to the quorum Q, then the participant acts as follows:
• Agreeing votes are no more than D. The poll is a
landslide loss. The initiator considers its current AU
copy damaged and repairs it (Section 4.1.7).
• Agreeing votes are at least V − D. The initiator con-
siders its current copy the prevailing one (landslide
win). This is the only way in which an opinion poll
concludes successfully. The initiator updates its refer-
ence list (Section 4.1.8) and schedules another poll at
a random future time uniformly centered at R.
• Agreeing votes are more than D but fewer than V −D.
The initiator considers the poll inconclusive and raises
an alarm (Section 4.1.13).
If the initiator has been unable to accumulate Q valid votes
from its inner circle, then it does not make a decision on its
AU; it updates its reference list (Section 4.1.8), and imme-
diately calls another poll. If it has failed to obtain Q votes
in a poll on this AU for a long time, the initiator raises an
inter-poll interval alarm (Section 4.1.13).
4.1.7 Repair
If the initiator decides that its AU is damaged, it picks at
random one of the disagreeing inner circle voters and sends it
an encrypted RepairRequest message containing the poll iden-
tifier. If it receives a Repair message (see Section 4.1.12), the
initiator re-verifies any disagreeing votes given the new AU
(Section 4.1.5) and re-tabulates the results (Section 4.1.6).
If it does not receive a Repair message, it picks another dis-
agreeing inner circle voter and tries again.
The initiator discards repairs that disagree with the vote
of the supplier of the repair and removes the supplier from
the reference list. The inconsistency between a vote and
the AU on which that vote was purportedly computed may
signal a fault at the repair supplier.
Note that the initiator need only make up to D repair
attempts. If during repairs the initiator has agreed with
more than D but fewer than V −D voters in total, it knows
that reaching a landslide win through subsequent repairs
is impossible. It deems the poll inconclusive, raising the
corresponding alarm (Section 4.1.13).
4.1.8 Reference List Update
Once a poll has concluded successfully, whether initially
or after a repair, the initiator updates its reference list by
the following four steps. First, it removes those peers on
whose votes it based its decision. Specifically, it removes all
disagreeing inner circle voters and enough randomly chosen
agreeing inner circle voters to make the total number of
removals Q (see Section 4.2.2). Second, it resets the time
inserted field of the remaining agreeing inner circle voters
in the reference list with the current poll counter. Third,
it inserts all outer circle peers whose votes were valid and
agreeing (with the eventual contents of the AU, after any
potential repairs). Fourth, it inserts randomly chosen entries
copied from its friends list up to a factor C of the reference
list size (the reference list is churned — see Section 4.2.4).
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Finally, it removes all peers that have not voted in the last
E polls it has called, i.e., those entries whose time inserted
is at least E polls less than the current poll counter.
A poll may fail to attract Q or more valid votes from
inner circle participants. If so, the poll initiator ignores all
disagreeing votes, but refreshes or inserts into the reference
list the agreeing votes from both circles.
4.1.9 Poll Solicitation
This and subsequent sections describe the opinion poll
protocol from the point of view of an invitee.
When a LOCKSS peer receives a Poll message from a poll
initiator, it chooses a fresh, random challenge value, a fresh,
random Diffie-Hellman public key, and computes a symmet-
ric session key from it and from the poll initiator’s public
key included in the Poll message. If the peer is not currently
the initiator of, or a voter in, another poll it decides to vote
in this new poll. It sends back a PollChallenge message of the
form [Poll ID, DH Public Key, challenge, YES ]. Otherwise,
it declines to vote and responds with a PollChallenge message
of the form [Poll ID, DH Public Key, challenge, NO ]. In ei-
ther case, the challenge and the YES/NO bit are encrypted
with the session key.
Finally, the peer sets an effort timer and waits for a Poll-
Proof message from the poll initiator (see Section 4.1.3). If
the message never arrives, the peer discards all poll state.
Otherwise, the peer verifies the PollProof message.
4.1.10 Poll Effort Verification
A voter verifies the poll effort proof it receives in a PollProof
message using the poll identifier and the challenge it sent to
the initiator (Section 4.1.9). If the verification succeeds,
the voter chooses I other peers at random from its own
reference list, and nominates them for inclusion into the poll
initiator’s outer circle via a Nominate message of the form
[Poll ID,Nominations] encrypted with the session key. Then
the voter constructs its vote.
4.1.11 Vote Construction
A vote consists of a hash of the AU interleaved with prov-
able computational effort.
Vote computation is divided into rounds, each returning a
proof of computational effort and a hash of this proof with a
portion of the AU. In each round, the computational effort
and the AU portion that is hashed both double in size (see
Section 4.2.1). The first round takes as input, and is de-
pendent upon, the challenge and poll identifier. Subsequent
rounds take as input, and are dependent upon, the output
of the previous round. The voter sends the proofs of com-
putational effort and AU hashes from all rounds in a single
encrypted Vote message to the poll initiator.
A peer who refused to participate in the poll sends back to
the initiator an encrypted Vote message with bogus contents.
4.1.12 Repair Solicitation
After the vote, the initiator of a poll may request a voter
to supply a repair via a RepairRequestmessage (Section 4.1.7).
If that voter has conducted a poll on the same AU in the
past, in which the initiator supplied a valid agreeing vote,
then the voter responds to the request with a Repair message.
The Repair message contains the poll identifier and its own
copy of the AU, encrypted with the symmetric session key.
Otherwise, the voter discards the request.
4.1.13 Alarms
LOCKSS peers raise alarms when they suspect that an
attack is under way. The alarm requests human involvement
in suppressing the attack, and is thus expensive.
An inconclusive poll alarm suggests that the library should
contact others, examine the differences between their copies
and determine a cause. Any compromised nodes found dur-
ing this process are repaired. If the institutions hosting the
peers voting for bad copies cannot be identified or do not
cooperate, their peers are blacklisted.
A local spoofing alarm suggests that the network surround-
ing the peer should be audited and any compromised nodes
removed. The cost of this alarm can be reduced by placing
peers on their own subnets.
An inter-poll interval alarm is raised if no poll has reached
quorum in several average inter-poll intervals. An attrition
attack may be underway (Section 5.2), or the peer may no
longer be fast enough to keep up with the system; human
attention is needed in either case. Logs with large numbers
of poll requests from previously unknown peers might lead
to potential attackers who should be blacklisted.
4.2 Protocol Analysis
To defend the LOCKSS system from attack, we make it
costly and time-consuming for an adversary to sway an opin-
ion poll in his favor or to waste loyal peers’ resources. This
means the protocol must
• prevent the adversary from gaining a foothold in a poll
initiator’s reference list (prevent him from populating
it with malign peers),
• make it expensive for the adversary to waste another
peer’s resources, and
• make it likely that the adversary’s attack will be de-
tected before it progresses far enough to cause irrecov-
erable damage.
We use provable recent effort, rate limiting, reference list
churning, and obfuscation of protocol state to make it ex-
pensive and slow for an adversary to gain a significant foot-
hold in a peer’s reference list or waste other peers resources.
We raise alarms when we detect signs of attack.
4.2.1 Effort Sizing
One application of our principle of inertia (Section 2) is
that large changes to the system require large efforts. In a
protocol where some valid messages cost nothing to produce,
but cause the expenditure of great effort — e.g., a cheap re-
quest causing its recipient to hash a large amount of data
— this principle is unfulfilled. To satisfy our inertia require-
ment in LOCKSS, we adjust the amount of effort involved in
message exchanges for voting, discovery, and poll initiation,
by embedding extra, otherwise unnecessary effort.
For this purpose we need a mechanism satisfying at least
three requirements. First, it must have an adjustable cost,
since different amounts of additional effort are needed at dif-
ferent protocol steps. Second, it must produce effort mea-
surable in the same units as the cost it adjusts (hashing
in our case). Third, the cost of generating the effort must
be greater than the cost of verifying it, which makes abuse
expensive.
We use a mechanism for provable effort based on a class
of memory-bound functions [1] (MBF) proposed by Dwork
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et al. [17] to prevent email spam. These cryptographic func-
tions have a computation phase, yielding a short proof of
effort, and a verification phase, which checks the validity of
that proof. A parameter of the system sets the asymmetry
factor by which the computation phase is more time consum-
ing than the adjustable cost of the verification phase. We
provide details on how we set the parameters of the MBF
mechanism in Appendix A.
MBFs are attractive for our purposes because the inher-
ent cost of the hashing necessary for voting is also memory-
bound, and because the difference in performance between
available memory systems is much less than the difference
in other characteristics such as CPU speed [16]. This obser-
vation has persisted across generations of technology. Nev-
ertheless, if another mechanism for imposing cost becomes
more attractive, the protocol could easily be revised to use
it; it is the concept of imposing costs on peers that is im-
portant rather than the particular mechanism we use.
In voting, the cost of constructing a vote must be greater
than the cost of processing the vote. We interleave AU hash-
ing with effort proof generation and transmit the resulting
proofs in the Vote message (Section 4.1.11). This ensures
that bogus votes causing the poll initiator to hash its AU
in vain are more expensive to create than the effort they
waste. The extra effort is interleaved with the hashing in
rounds to prevent a cheap, bogus vote from wasting a lot of
verification effort. The rounds ensure that generating a vote
that is valid up to round i − 1 but then invalid costs more
than its verification up to the i-th round.
In discovery, we require peers found via others’ nomina-
tions to participate first in the outer circle of a poll and
generate a valid agreeing but ineffectual vote before they
are invited into the reference list. They must thus prove
substantial effort (and wait on average more than R) before
they are able to affect the result of a poll. This makes it
expensive and time-consuming for a malign peer to get an
opportunity to vote maliciously and effectively.
Finally, in poll initiation, an initiator must expend more
effort than the cumulative effort it imposes on the voters in
its poll. Otherwise, a malign peer would initiate spurious
polls at no cost, causing loyal peers to waste their resources.
We require the poll initiator to prove more effort in the
PollEffort message (Section 4.1.3) than the voter needs to
verify that effort and then construct its vote.
4.2.2 Timeliness Of Effort
Our principle of avoiding third-party reputation leads us
to use several techniques to ensure that only proofs of re-
cent effort can affect the system. They prevent an adversary
from exploiting evidence of good behavior accumulated over
time. The requester of a poll effort proof supplies a chal-
lenge on which the proof must depend; the first round of a
subsequent vote depends on that proof, and each subsequent
round depends on the round preceding it. Neither proofs nor
votes can be precomputed.
Peers must supply a vote, and thus a proof of effort, to
be admitted to the reference list, except for churning. If
several polls take place without the admitted peer taking
part, perhaps because it died, the initiator removes it. If the
admitted peer is invited and does take part in a poll, it must
supply a vote and thus further proof of effort. After the poll
the initiator “forgets” the peer if it disagreed, or if it agreed
but was chosen among the Q peers removed (Section 4.1.8).
To limit the effect of this removal on loyal peers’ reference
list size, we treat the poll as if it had a bare quorum and
remove only the corresponding number of agreeing peers;
additional agreeing peers do not affect the result and are
thus treated as part of the outer circle for this purpose.
By these means we ensure that any peer identity, whether
loyal or malign, must continually be sustained by at least
a minimum rate of expenditure of effort if it is not to dis-
appear from the system. Although the lack of long-term
secrets makes it cheap for an adversary to create an iden-
tity, sustaining that identity for long enough to affect the
system is expensive. Unless the adversary’s resources are
truly unlimited, there are better uses for them than main-
taining identities that do not contribute to his goals.
4.2.3 Rate Limiting
Another application of our principle of inertia (Section 2)
is that the system should not change rapidly no matter how
much effort is applied to it. We use rate-limiting techniques
to implement this.
Loyal peers call polls autonomously and infrequently, but
often enough to prevent random undetected damage from
affecting readers significantly. This sets the effort required
of the voters, and means that an adversary can damage a
loyal peer only when that peer calls a poll. The rate at
which an attack can make progress is limited by the smaller
of the adversary’s efforts and the efforts of his victims. The
adversary cannot affect this limit on the rate at which he
can damage loyal peers.
4.2.4 Reference List Churning
A protocol attacker (Section 5.2) needs to populate a loyal
peer’s reference list with malign peers as a precondition for
damaging its AU. We reduce the predictability of the mech-
anism by which the reference list is updated using churning.
It is important for a peer to avoid depending on a fixed set
of peers for maintenance of its AU, because those peers may
become faulty or subversion targets. It is equally important
not to depend entirely on peers nominated by other peers of
whose motives the peer is unaware.
By churning into the reference list a few peers from its
friends list in addition to the outer circle agreeing voters,
the initiator hampers attempts to fill the reference list with
malign conspirators. Absent an attack, the proportion of
malign peers in both the outer circle and the friends list
matches the population as a whole. An adversary’s attempt
to subvert the random sampling process by nominating only
malign peers raises the proportion of malign peers in the
outer circle but not in the friends list. Churning reduces
the effect of the attack because, on average, the friends list
is less malign than the outer circle, even when the initial
friends list contains subverted peers.
4.2.5 Obfuscation of Protocol State
Our design principles (Section 2) include assuming a pow-
erful adversary, capable of observing traffic at many points
in the network. We obfuscate protocol state in two ways to
deny him information about a poll other than that obtained
from the malign participants.
First, we encrypt all but the first protocol message ex-
changed by a poll initiator and each potential voter, using
a fresh symmetric key for each poll and voter. Second, we
make all loyal peers invited into a poll, even those who de-
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cline to vote, go through the motions of the protocol, behind
the cover of encryption. This prevents an adversary from
using traffic analysis to infer state such as the number of
loyal peers who actually vote in a specific poll. Note that
in our modeled adversary and simulations we conservatively
assume that the adversary can infer such information.
4.2.6 Alarms
In accordance with our design principle that intrusion de-
tection be inherent in the system, the protocol raises an
alarm when a peer determines that a poll is inconclusive,
suspects local spoofing, or has been unable to complete a
poll for a long time. Raising an alarm is thus expensive;
a significant rate of false alarms would render the system
useless (Section 7.1).
The expectation is that alarms result in enough loss to
the adversary, for example by causing operators to remove
damage, malign peers and compromised nodes, that a ratio-
nal adversary will be highly motivated to avoid them, unless
raising alarms is his primary goal.
5. ADVERSARY ANALYSIS
A peer-to-peer system running on a public network must
expect to be attacked, even if the attackers have nothing
tangible to gain. We present the capabilities we assume of
adversaries (Section 5.1), explore the space of attacks they
can mount in terms of goals (Section 5.2), and identify spe-
cific attack techniques available to adversaries (Section 5.3).
Finally, we describe in detail the particular adversaries we
study in this paper (Section 5.4).
5.1 Adversary Capabilities
The adversary we study in this paper controls a group of
malign peers. We believe the following abilities match our
“powerful adversary” design principle:
Total Information Awareness Malign peers know each
other. Any information known to one malign peer,
including the identities of other malign peers involved
in a poll, is immediately known to all.
Perfect Work Balancing Any of the adversary’s nodes
can perform work on his behalf and relay it instan-
taneously to the node presumed to have performed it.
Perfect Digital Preservation The malign peers have mag-
ically incorruptible copies of both the good AU and as
many bad ones as they require.
Local Eavesdropping The adversary is aware of the exis-
tence and contents of packets originating or terminat-
ing at a network on which he controls a physical node.
He cannot observe the existence or contents of packets
that originate and terminate anywhere else.
Local Spoofing From a routing realm in which he controls
a physical node, the adversary can send IP packets
whose ostensible source is any local address and desti-
nation is any Internet address; or he can send packets
whose ostensible source is any Internet address and
destination is a local address.
However, the adversary cannot usefully send IP pack-
ets whose ostensible source and destination addresses
are from routing realms within which he has no control.
The protocol’s encryption handshake prevents peers
from taking part in polls unless they can receive pack-
ets at their ostensible address (see Section 4.1.9). The
adversary cannot benefit from spoofing IP addresses
on whose traffic he cannot eavesdrop.
Stealth A loyal peer cannot detect that another peer exe-
cuting the LOCKSS protocol is malign.
Unconstrained Identities The adversary can increase the
number of identities he can assume in the system, by
purchasing or spoofing IP addresses.
Exploitation of Common Peer Vulnerabilities The ad-
versary can instantaneously take over those peers from
the LOCKSS population that run an implementation
with the same exploitable vulnerability. He can then
instantly change the state and/or the logic of the af-
flicted peers, causing them to become malign.
Complete Parameter Knowledge Although loyal peers
actively obfuscate protocol state (Section 4.2.5), we
assume that the adversary knows the values of protocol
parameters, including Q, N , A and D, as set by loyal
peers.
We measure the adversary by the extent to which he can
subvert loyal peers by any means, and by the total computa-
tional power he has available. Our analyses and simulations
do not depend on identifying the cause of an individual peer
becoming malign.
5.2 Adversary Attacks
Attacks against LOCKSS can be divided according to
their functional approach into platform attacks and proto-
col attacks. Platform attacks seek to subvert the system
hosting the LOCKSS implementation, either to tamper with
the logic and data of LOCKSS from the inside or to use a
LOCKSS peer as a jumping point for further unrelated at-
tacks. Our implementation makes considerable efforts to
resist platform attacks [31]. We do not address platform
attacks further in this paper. We do, however, allow our
simulated adversary to mount such attacks successfully, tak-
ing over a substantial portion of the peer population at the
beginning of the simulations (See Section 6.1).
We can divide protocol attacks according to the role within
the LOCKSS protocol whose operations the adversary ma-
nipulates for his purposes. In general, inner circle peers
within a poll command greater power for mischief than outer
circle peers, poll initiators can hurt their own polls but not
much more, and spoofing and eavesdropping are most help-
ful when available near a loyal poll initiator’s network. We
analyse attacks by role in Section 5.5.
Finally, we can divide attacks according to the goals of
the adversary. Different adversary goals require different
combinations of platform and protocol attacks. We list brief
descriptions of some possible adversary goals below:
Stealth Modification The adversary wishes to replace the
protected content with his version (the bad content).
His goal is to change, through protocol exchanges, as
many replicas of the content held by loyal peers as
possible without being detected, i.e., before the sys-
tem raises an alarm. Measures of his success are the
proportion of loyal peers in the system hosting replicas
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of the bad content at the time of the first alarm, and
the probability that a reader requesting the content
from any peer in the system obtains the bad content.
Nuisance The adversary wishes to raise frequent, spurious
LOCKSS alarms to dilute the credibility of alarms and
to waste (primarily human) resources at loyal peers. A
measure of adversary success is the time it takes for the
adversary to raise the first alarm (the lower, the better
for the adversary).
Attrition The adversary wishes to prevent loyal peers from
repairing damage to their replicas caused by naturally
occurring failures. Towards that goal, he wastes the
computational resources of loyal peers so that they
cannot successfully call polls to audit and repair their
replicas. Measures of his success are the time between
successful polls called by loyal peers or the busyness
of loyal peers (in both cases the higher, the better for
the adversary).
Theft The adversary wishes to obtain published content
without the consent of the publisher. For example, he
wishes to obtain for-fee content without paying the fee.
A measure of adversary success is the time to obtain
a copy of the restricted content (the lower, the better
for the adversary).
Free-loading The adversary wishes to obtain services with-
out supplying services to other peers in return. For
example, he wishes to obtain repairs for his own repli-
cas, without supplying repairs to those who request
them from him. A measure of his success is the ratio
of repairs supplied to repairs received (the lower, the
better for the adversary).
In this paper we focus on adversaries with the stealth
modification, nuisance, and attrition goals. We choose these
three goals because they have the greatest potential, es-
pecially in concert, to disrupt the preservation work of a
community of LOCKSS peers, since they can directly or in-
directly hurt the preserved content and discredit the func-
tions of the system that can detect the damage. In the rest
of this section, we briefly describe what LOCKSS can do
about theft and free-loading.
The LOCKSS system does not materially increase the risk
of theft. Repairs are the only protocol exchanges in which
content is transferred. A peer supplies a repair only if the
requester has previously proved with an agreeing vote that it
once had the same content (see Section 4.1.12). The protocol
cannot be used to obtain a first instance of an AU. Most
e-journals authorize ranges of IP address for institutional
subscribers; existing LOCKSS peers use this mechanism to
authorize their crawls for first instances of content. If more
secure forms of content authorization (e.g., Shibboleth [20])
become widely accepted, LOCKSS peers can use them.
The repair mechanism also limits the problem of free-
loading. The primary good exchanged in LOCKSS, content
repair, is only available to peers who prove through voting
that they have had the content in the past. A peer who
votes dutifully — so as to be able to obtain repairs if nec-
essary — but does not itself supply repairs to others can
hardly be described as free-loading, given the cost of the
voting required. Tit-for-tat refusal to supply repairs to such
antisocial peers might further deter this behavior.
In the next section, we present attack techniques available
to the adversary. We combine these techniques in later sec-
tions, to produce adversary strategies towards the stealth
modification, nuisance, and attrition goals.
5.3 Attack Techniques
In this section, we identify possible attack vectors against
the LOCKSS opinion poll protocol, and we describe how
they can be exploited.
5.3.1 Adversary Foothold in a Reference List
The composition of a loyal peer’s reference list is of pri-
mary importance. A loyal peer chooses inner circle par-
ticipants for a poll that it initiates from its reference list
at random (see Section 4.1.2); as a result, the proportion
of malign peers in the inner circle approximates their pro-
portion in the poll initiator’s reference list. An adversary
wishing to control the outcome of a poll initiated by a loyal
peer can increase his chances by increasing the proportion
of malign peers in that peer’s reference list.
To gain an initial foothold in loyal peers’ reference lists,
the adversary must take over peers that used to be loyal. He
does this, for example, by exploiting common implementa-
tion vulnerabilities, or by coercing peer operators to act as
he wishes. He can then increase that foothold, but to do so
he must wait until a loyal peer invites a malign peer into the
inner circle of a poll. When invited, the adversary causes
the malign peer to nominate other malign peers unknown to
the poll initiator. Note that loyal peers also inadvertently
nominate malign peers.
Malign peers in loyal peers’ reference lists must behave
as loyal peers until an attack requires otherwise. Each such
peer thus consumes adversary resources as it must both vote
in and call polls to avoid detection and maintain its position
in the list (Section 4.2.2).
We measure the adversary’s success at maintaining a foot-
hold in loyal peer’s reference lists with the average foothold
ratio over the population of loyal peers. For a given ref-
erence list, the foothold ratio is the proportion of the list
occupied by malign peers.
The LOCKSS protocol has two lines of defense against
reference list takeover. First, loyal peers only change their
reference lists after a poll that they call; the adversary must
wait until they do so before he can increase his foothold
(see Section 4.2.3). Second, churning of the reference list
allows the operator of a loyal peer to trade off the risks of
depending too much on a static set of friendly peers against
those of depending too much on peers nominated by others
for the outer circle of polls (Section 4.2.4).
5.3.2 Delayed Commitment
The adversary need not decide in advance how each of its
malign peers will react to particular poll invitations. Instead
he can determine how a particular malign peer behaves after
having collected all available information about a poll or its
initiator, as per his Total Information Awareness and Stealth
capabilities (Section 5.1).
Loyal peers can defend against this adaptive adversary by
requesting commitments on future protocol steps as early as
possible. During repairs, the requester checks that the repair
it receives is consistent with the vote of the repair supplier.
During voting, the poll initiator could request from potential
voters an early commitment on the hash of a few bytes of the
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AU, chosen randomly. Later, the poll initiator could verify
that each vote is consistent with the AU version to which
that voter committed. This would reduce the adversary’s
ability to attack only polls he is sure of winning and increase
the probability of detection. Our simulations currently use
the former defense but not the latter.
5.3.3 Peer Profiling
Using the Local Eavesdropping capability, the adversary
can observe a loyal peer’s traffic and attempt to infer useful
information such as likely members of the peer’s reference
list, likely participants in a poll, and whether or not the
peer has agreed to vote in a poll. The adversary can use
this information to make better decisions, as with delayed
commitment, or to mount flooding attacks against invited
loyal peers whose sessions he can hijack (Section 5.3.4).
Loyal peers defend against eavesdroppers by actively ob-
fuscating their protocol state (Section 4.2.5).
5.3.4 Session Hijacking
The LOCKSS system lacks stable identities because it
cannot support them without long-term secrets. An attacker
can thus impersonate loyal peers and hijack their sessions,
using his Local Spoofing capability (Section 5.1). By spoof-
ing local source addresses in messages it sends to remote
peers, or remote source addresses in messages it sends to lo-
cal peers, a malign peer within spoofing range of a poll ini-
tiator can affect the poll result by either hijacking sessions
between the poll initiator and loyal invitees, or discrediting
loyal invitees of his choosing.
The malign peer can hijack a session by responding to the
initiator’s Poll message with a spoofed PollChallenge message
establishing a session key. If the initiator also receives the
genuine PollChallenge message, the two conflict, the invitee is
discredited, and the hijack fails. If, however, the loyal invitee
fails to respond with a PollChallenge or the adversary manages
to suppress it, perhaps by flooding the loyal invitee’s link,
the hijack can succeed and the malign peer can vote in the
loyal invitee’s place. Once established, a session is protected
by a session key and can no longer be hijacked.
Alternatively, the malign peer local to the poll initiator
can selectively discredit loyal invitees by also responding
with a spoofed, conflicting PollChallenge. Votes based on ei-
ther challenge are not tallied, as the initiator lacks a means
to distinguish between them. By suppressing loyal votes in
this way the adversary can increase his foothold ratio (Sec-
tion 5.3.1), or waste human resources by raising spoofing
alarms (Section 4.2.6).
The operators of a loyal peer can defend against hijack-
ing by checking its network vicinity for subverted peers or
routers, by providing it with a dedicated subnet, and by
monitoring for packets spoofing the router’s MAC address.
Loyal peers could retransmit their potentially suppressed
PollChallenge messages at random intervals throughout the
poll. If any of these retransmissions get to the initiator,
the hijacked session is discredited. This would force the ad-
versary to suppress traffic from the hijacked peer for many
hours, increasing the probability of detection.
5.4 Attack Strategies
In this section, we take a closer look at three kinds of
adversaries: first, an adversary whose goal is to modify an
AU stealthily across loyal peers so as to change the scien-
tific record persistently (Section 5.4.1); second, an adversary
whose goal is to discredit the LOCKSS alarm mechanism,
thereby rendering it incapable of reacting to attacks (Sec-
tion 5.4.2); and third, an adversary whose goal is to slow
down LOCKSS long enough for random faults to cause ir-
recoverable damage in the content. For all three types of
adversaries, we describe an attack strategy. In Section 6,
we measure through simulation how LOCKSS fares against
such attacks.
5.4.1 Stealth Modification Strategy
The stealth adversary has to balance two goals: changing
the consensus on the target AU and remaining undetected.
To achieve these goals, he must repeatedly find a healthy
poll initiator, convince it that it has a damaged AU replica
without causing it to raise any alarms, and then, if asked,
conveniently offer it a repair with the bad version of the
AU. This strategy relies primarily on building a foothold
in loyal peers’ reference lists (Section 5.3.1) and on delayed
commitment (Section 5.3.2).
The stealth adversary acts in two phases. First he lurks
seeking to build a foothold in loyal peers’ reference lists but
otherwise behaving as a loyal peer, voting and repairing with
the correct version of the AU. Then he attacks, causing his
malign peers to vote and repair using either the correct or
the bad version of the AU, as needed. During the attack
phase malign peers vote with the correct copy unless a poll
is vulnerable, i.e., one in which the overwhelming majority
of the inner circle is malign. In vulnerable polls malign
peers vote with the bad copy, because by doing so they can
change the loyal initiator’s AU without detection. Polls are
vulnerable if the following three conditions hold:
M + L ≥ Q (1)
M > L (2)
L ≤ D (3)
Condition 1 ensures that the V = M + L peers agreeing to
vote satisfy the quorum Q. Condition 2 ensures that the M
malign peers determine the result with an absolute majority
of the votes. Condition 3 ensures that the L loyal peers
are not enough to raise an inconclusive poll alarm at the
initiator. Our modeled adversary has Complete Parameter
Knowledge (Section 5.1) and can evaluate this vulnerability
criterion exactly, in accordance to our “strong adversary”
design principle. In a practical system an adversary would
have only estimates of L, Q, and D, and would thus run a
higher risk of detection than in our simulations.
The protocol provides several defenses that are especially
relevant against the stealth adversary. Individually none is
very strong; in combination they are quite effective. First, in
accord with our rate-limiting principle, the adversary cannot
induce loyal peers to call vulnerable polls but has to wait
until they occur.
Second, a damaged peer continues to call and vote in polls
using its now bad copy of the AU. Unlike malign peers, it
does not evaluate the vulnerability criterion or decide be-
tween the good and bad versions. If more than D damaged
peers take part in a poll called by a healthy peer but the
adversary deems the poll invulnerable, an inconclusive poll
alarm is raised.
Third, a damaged peer continues to call polls and may
invite enough healthy peers into its inner circle to repair
the damage. For each loyal peer the stealth adversary dam-
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ages, he must expend resources to maintain his foothold in
the peer’s reference list and vote whenever it invites malign
peers until the bad version of the AU prevails everywhere.
Finally, if the stealth adversary fools the initiator of a
vulnerable poll into requesting a repair, he must ensure that
the request will go to one of the malign peers. The initiator
requests repairs only from peers in whose polls it has voted;
others would refuse the request as they lack evidence that
the requester once had a valid copy (Section 4.1.12). Thus
the stealth adversary must expend effort to call polls as well
as vote in polls called by the loyal peers.
5.4.2 Nuisance Strategy
The nuisance adversary has a simple goal: to raise alarms
at loyal peers as fast as possible. The nuisance adversary
can cause all three types of alarms (Section 4.2.6).
To cause an inconclusive poll alarm, the adversary can
use delayed commitment. Every time some of his malign
peers are invited into a poll, he evaluates the vulnerability
criterion
M + L ≥ Q (4)
L > D (5)
M > D (6)
Apart from reaching a quorum (Condition 4), the criterion
means that neither are the loyal votes few enough to lose
quietly (Condition 5), nor are the malign votes few enough
to allow a landslide win by the loyal votes (Condition 6).
When the adversary detects that this criterion is met, he
instructs his malign peers to vote in the poll with a bogus
AU, thereby causing the poll to raise an inconclusive alarm.
If the criterion is not met, the adversary instructs his malign
peers to vote with the correct AU. This is necessary, so that
malign peers can remain in the reference list of the poll
initiator (see Section 4.1.6) for another try in the future;
the adversary can foster the satisfaction of the vulnerability
criterion by building a foothold in the reference list of the
poll initiator (Section 5.3.1).
The adversary can cause a spoofing alarm by sending con-
flicting PollChallege messages to the poll initiator. This strat-
egy can yield spoofing alarms when the adversary has more
than A malign peers in the invited inner circle of a poll.
Then, without having a spoofer near the poll initiator, the
adversary can cause the initiator to suspect a local spoofer
and to raise frivolous alarms, which waste human resources
at the initiator.
The adversary can cause an inter-poll interval alarm by
foiling loyal peers’ attempts to call a poll successfully for
long enough. This strategy is similar to a strategy with the
goal of attrition (Section 5.4.3).
The nuisance adversary need not have his malign peers
call polls, because he does not seek to obtain or supply re-
pairs. However, he needs to have his malign peers invited
in polls. As a result, he must follow the observable aspects
protocol (voting with valid votes when asked) unless he can
attack a particular poll.
LOCKSS defends against the nuisance adversary primar-
ily via the autonomy with which loyal peers decide when to
call polls. As a result, a nuisance adversary must persist
for a while, increasing his foothold in the reference lists of
loyal peers, before he can attack a particular poll raising an
inconclusive poll alarm.
5.4.3 Attrition Strategy
The attrition adversary’s goal is to occupy the time the
loyal peers have available for voting, making it less likely
that a poll called by a loyal peer will gain a quorum of voters.
Success is measured by the average time between successful,
quorate polls at loyal peers. If the attrition adversary can
increse this interval enough, random damage at the loyal
peers can accumulate and degrade the system.
The attrition adversary’s strategy is to call polls as fast as
possible, inviting only loyal peers. The adversary’s peers do
not vote in polls called by other peers; there is no need to
persuade loyal peers to fetch repairs from them. We do not
yet use a “newcomer pays extra” strategy so the attrition
adversary can currently use one-time throw-away identities
to call the polls.
The attrition adversary’s impact on the system is cur-
rently limited only by the rate at which he can compute the
proofs of effort demanded by the loyal voters he is trying
to involve in his polls. We are investigating techniques that
limit his impact more effectively (see Section 9).
5.5 Attack Anaylsis by Peer Role
We divide the description of the attacks according to the
role played in the poll by the malign peer. For each role, we
examine attacks that affect the result of the poll, and those
that degrade the quality of the initiator’s reference list.
We also describe additional attacks that deny service, and
some spoofing attacks.
5.5.1 Poll initiator
The worst a malign poll initiator can do is to deny service.
Affect poll result A malign poll initiator can affect the
result of a poll he initiates, but to no effect on the rest
of the system, since he is already malign.
Degrade reference list A malign poll initiator can de-
grade his own reference list, but to no effect on the
rest of the system, since he is already malign.
Deny service The attrition adversary acts as a malign poll
initiator and invites large numbers of loyal peers into
polls to waste their resources and prevent them from
coming to consensus. We set the poll effort cost to
make this attack very expensive (Section 4.2.1), and
raise an inter-poll interval alarm if we detect it.
5.5.2 Inner circle
A malign peer invited into the inner circle of a loyal peer’s
poll can take part in all three kinds of attacks.
Affect poll result If enough malign peers are invited into
a poll they can affect the result without detection (Sec-
tion 5.4.1). The nuisance adversary attacks a poll if it
meets the criteria discussed in Section 5.4.2).
Degrade reference list A malign inner circle invitee has
the opportunity to degrade the quality of the initiator’s
reference list, by recommending other malign peers
into the poll’s outer circle. Malign peers recommended
for the outer circle will only get into the loyal poll ini-
tiator’s reference list if they expend effort and vote
with the consensus.
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However, the malign peers have an advantage over the
loyal peers. They know the identities of the other ma-
lign peers. The loyal peers will recommend B malign
peers on average, but the malign peers will recommend
only malign peers. Doing so costs the adversary effort
over time because the malign invitees have to exert
effort to get in and stay in the loyal peer’s reference
list. The loyal peers also have to exert effort to stay in
the malign peer’s lists, even if this particular effort is
wasted. The malign peers do not have to exert effort
to stay in their co-conspirator’s lists.
Deny service A malign inner circle peer can do four things
to deny service, only the last of which is effective:
• It could generate a bogus vote in a poll the ma-
lign peers are certain to lose. The initiator will
eliminate the vote with much less effort than it
took to create and remove the malign peer from
its reference list. This is not a good strategy.
• It could recommend loyal peers into the outer cir-
cle then discredit the poll by inviting the same
loyal peers into a bogus poll with the same ID.
The effort of creating the bogus poll is larger than
the cost to these loyal peers of detecting that it
is bogus. The adversary would benefit more from
using the effort to degrade the initiator’s reference
list further.
• It could refuse to send a vote, raising the proba-
bility that the poll would fail to get a quorum, at
the risk of losing its slot in the initiator’s refer-
ence list if the poll does achieve a quorum. Unless
the adversary is resource-constrained, the malign
peer should vote and recommend other malign
peers.
5.5.3 Outer circle
A malign peer invited into the outer circle of a poll is
offered a chance to occupy a place in the loyal peer initiator’s
reference list. This is a valuable opportunity to attack a
future vulnerable poll.
Affect poll result Amalign outer circle invitee cannot change
the result of the poll because the initiator will not con-
sider its vote.
Degrade reference list To degrade the reference list, the
malign outer circle invitee must vote with the consen-
sus. It must then continue to act as a healthy peer in
future polls until the malign peers decide to attack.
Deny service A malign outer circle invitee could also re-
main mute, causing a shortage of outer circle partici-
pants, but the adversary would benefit more from de-
grading the initiator’s reference list.
6. SIMULATION
We have evaluated our new protocol’s resistance to ran-
dom failures and malicious attacks using the simulation we
present in this section. We first describe our simulation en-
vironment in Section 6.1. Then we explain how we simulate
loyal peers (Section 6.2). Then in Section 6.3 we describe
how we simulate the different adversary strategies from Sec-
tion 5.4. Section 7 collects our simulation results.
6.1 Simulation Environment
In this section, we describe the simulation environment
we use for our evaluation. This includes our simulator, the
network model we employ, and our application-layer overlay
topology initialization.
We use Narses, a Java-based discrete-event simulator [21]
designed for scalability over large numbers of nodes, large
amounts of traffic, and long periods of time. Narses offers
facilities for a variety of flow-based network models allow-
ing trade-offs between speed and accuracy. The simulator
can also model expensive computations, such as hashes and
proofs of effort, allowing some realism in our simulation of
protocols involving cryptographic primitives.
Since we simulate a LOCKSS network for up to 30 (simu-
lated) years, we use a faster-to-simulate network model that
considers propagation latency but not traffic congestion. We
simulate the underlying network topology as a star at the
center of which lies the “core.” Individual nodes are linked
to the core via a link whose bandwidth is chosen at random
among 1.5, 10 and 1000 Mbps, and whose propagation la-
tency is chosen uniformly at random from 1 to 30 ms. The
core has infinite switching capacity; as a result, the effective
bandwidth of a flow from node A to node B is the minimum
bandwidth of the two links, and its propagation latency is
the sum of the propagation latencies of the two links.
Every simulation run starts with an initial population
of 1000 peers, each storing an AU that takes 120 seconds
to hash. The dynamic contents of the reference lists of
these peers determine the application-layer topology of the
LOCKSS overlay. As the protocol requires, the reference list
of each peer is initialized with the content of its friends list.
We initialize each peer’s friends list with a clustering tech-
nique. Peers are randomly assigned to clusters of 30 peers.
For each peer, we add 29 other peers to its friends list, 80%
of which are chosen randomly from its own cluster and the
rest chosen randomly from other clusters.
We simulate a provable effort mechanism similar to the
MBF scheme devised by Dwork et al. [17]. In keeping with
the constraints placed by that scheme and with the require-
ments we set out in Section 4.2.1, we derive one possible
set of provable effort sizes for the protocol (Appendix A).
Given that hashing the AU costs S, the poll effort construc-
tion size (Section 4.1.3) is (20/3)S, the verification of a poll
effort proof (Section 4.1.10) costs (5/3)S, the cost of com-
puting a valid vote (Section 4.1.11) is 5S, and the cost of
verifying a vote (Section 4.1.5) is 2S for agreeing and S for
disagreeing votes.
If the cost of hashing the AU is 120 seconds, the initia-
tor spends 800 seconds per invitee generating the PollProof
message and 240 seconds per invitee verifying an agreeing
Vote message. Each invitee spends 200 seconds verifying the
PollProof message and 600 seconds generating the Vote mes-
sage. An entire successfully concluded poll without repairs
costs the initiator 1040 seconds of computation per invitee.
With 20 invitees it would take 6 hours, which is comparable
to the duration of polls in the current test.
6.2 Simulated Loyal LOCKSS Peers
We simulate loyal LOCKSS peers as simple state machines
implementing the protocol of Section 4. We set the protocol
parameters (see Section 4.1) to values reflecting those in the
60-peer tests of the existing system (N = 20, Q = 10, D = 3,
A = 3, I = 10, E = 4 polls), except R = 3 months which
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we estimate reflects production use.
We set protocol timers to be just long enough for the slow-
est machine to complete the corresponding protocol step.
Peers always consider themselves the fastest. For example,
peers who have been invited into a poll give the poll initiator
enough time to compute the poll effort proof for N invitees
(see Section 4.1.9), assuming that the poll initiator has a
memory system 5 times slower than theirs [17].
Our simulated peers commit to a poll exclusively, for the
duration of that poll, even when idly waiting for a protocol
message to come back. However, a peer that wishes to call
its own poll but is also invited in another poll called by
someone else prefers to call its own poll.
All loyal peers in a simulation run have the same nominal
rate of random undetected errors that unobtrusively replace
the victim’s AU replica with random bits.
6.3 Simulated Adversary
In this section we address our simulation of LOCKSS ad-
versaries. We outline how we represent an adversary and
his malign peers, and then we describe how we implement
within our simulation environment the attack techniques
available to him (see Section 5.3).
We simulate an adversary as a multi-homed node with as
many network interfaces (NICs) as the number of IP ad-
dresses, and as many CPUs as the number of nodes con-
trolled by the adversary (i.e., one humongous computer).
The numbers of NICs and CPUs are parameters of the sim-
ulation. An adversary with few NICs and many CPUs has a
lot of processing power at his disposal, but is without a great
presence in the network. An adversary with many NICs and
fewer CPUs has some processing power but a lot of scope
for spoofing IP addresses.
To gain a foothold in loyal peers’ initial reference lists
(Section 5.3.1), the adversary may use his ability to take
over some of the LOCKSS peer population (see Section 5.1).
We initialize simulation runs at the instant when the take-
over is complete. For example, to run a simulation where
the adversary subverts 30% of the 1000 peers, but also has
100 extra CPUs at his disposal, we simulate an adversary
with 1000×30%+100 = 400 CPUs and only 700 loyal peers.
In our simulations, once the adversary receives a PollProof
message via one of its NICs, he considers the number of
those NICs via which he has received Poll messages thus far
to be M for this poll (see Section 4.1). Then, the adversary
divides the list of its own NICs among theM malign peers as
which he participates in the inner circle of the poll. When a
particular malign peer NIC receives a PollProof message, the
adversary waits the appropriate time for the verification of
the poll effort proof and then responds with a Nominate mes-
sage holding the corresponding portion of the list of malign
NICs. The adversary thus ensures that the loyal poll ini-
tiator will insert into its outer circle the maximum number
of malign peer addresses; the adversary cannot do better,
without knowledge of the nominations of other loyal inner
circle peers.
We simulate delayed commitment (Section 5.3.2) by wait-
ing until the adversary must start computing his first vote
before deciding on which AU that first vote will be. At
that time, the adversary evaluates the appropriate poll vul-
nerability criterion, according to the strategy we simulate,
decides whether to attack the poll and how, and commits to
the appropriate version of the AU.
We simulate the adversary’s ability to profile loyal peers
(Section 5.3.3) by making all variable protocol parameters
known to him. We do not, in this paper, otherwise simulate
the presence of eavesdroppers near loyal peers.
Finally, we do not simulate in this work the adversary’s
ability to hijack poll sessions between loyal poll initiators
and their loyal invitees.
6.3.1 Simulated Stealth Modification Adversary
We simulate the effects on LOCKSS of an attack by an
adversary following the stealth modification strategy (Sec-
tion 5.4.1) in two sets: lurking and attacking simulations,
corresponding to the lurking and attack phases of the strat-
egy. In lurking simulations, the adversary seeks only to ex-
tend his foothold in loyal peers’ reference lists. After ini-
tially subverting some of the loyal peers, the adversary has
malign peers behave exactly as loyal peers do, except for for-
mulating their Nominate messages as described in Section 6.3
above. Lurking simulations last 20 simulated years.
In attacking simulations, malign peers seek not only to
extend their foothold in loyal peers’ reference lists, but also
to change the loyal peers’ replicas of the AU with the bad
version that the adversary wishes to install throughout the
community. Therefore, malign peers also evaluate the vul-
nerability criterion and decide, as described in the previous
section, on which AU to base their votes and their repairs.
We initialize the population in an attacking simulation as
if a lurking phase preceded the simulation: we initialize the
reference lists of loyal peers with a given foothold ratio. At-
tacking simulations last 10 simulated years, unless an incon-
clusive poll alarm is raised.
To draw conclusions about entire stealth modification at-
tacks, we must combine the results of a lurking simulation
with the results of a compatible attacking simulation. We
accomplish this by first running a set of lurking simulations
for the set of input parameters we seek to study. Based on
these runs, we identify how great a foothold ratio the adver-
sary can obtain, for given input parameters. Then we run
a set of attacking simulations with input parameters that
match the input parameters of the lurking simulations as
well as the observed possible foothold ratios gained by the
adversary. For example, when studying the stealth modifi-
cation adversary who begins by subverting 20% of the 1000
initially loyal peers, we run a number of lurking simulations
(for different random seeds), from which we conclude that
the adversary can obtain average foothold ratios of 40 to
55%. Based on this, we only run attacking simulations for
20% subversion of the 1000 initially loyal peers and initial
attack-phase foothold ratios that range between 40 and 55%.
Splitting the strategy into two sets of simulations allows us
to explore the choice the adversary makes about the foothold
he must achieve before switching from lurking to attacking.
In our results, we assign the first possible time at which
this foothold is achieved for a given initial subversion as the
duration of the lurk phase for that subversion.
In both lurking and attacking simulations, the adversary
calls polls as a loyal peer would, with two differences. First,
malign peers never verify votes that they receive on the polls
they initiate, since the adversary does not care about the
outcome of the poll. Second, the adversary never invites its
malign peers into his own polls, since he calls polls only to
convince loyal peers to ask him for repairs.
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Figure 2: The total rate of false alarms versus the
mean time between random undetected damage at
each peer, with no adversary.
6.3.2 Simulated Nuisance Adversary
To simulate the effects on LOCKSS of an attack by an
adversary following the nuisance strategy (Section 5.4.2) we
run simulations similar to the attacking simulations of the
stealth modification adversary (Section 6.3.1).
Nuisance simulations differ from attacking stealth simu-
lations in three ways. First, the adversary does not call
polls, because he has no vested interest in maintaining a
convincing fac¸ade of compliance. Second, he does not lurk
but rather attacks any vulnerable polls immediately. Third,
he uses a weaker vulnerability criterion.
6.3.3 Simulated Attrition Adversary
We simulate the attrition adversary with unlimited identi-
ties but limited resources. He calls useless polls to consume
the loyal peers’ resources. Unlike the stealth adversary, he
neither lurks to degrade reference lists nor attacks polls.
Loyal peers give priority to calling their own polls, their
remaining resources go to participating in polls called by
others. A loyal peer raises an inter-poll interval alarm if it
has not completed a poll in 3 times the expected inter-poll
interval.
7. RESULTS
In this section we evaluate the new LOCKSS opinion poll
protocol through simulation. We explore how the protocol
deals with random storage faults, as well as attacks by the
stealth modification adversary (Section 5.2). We demon-
strate the following points:
• Absent an attack, substantial rates of random damage
at peers result in low rates of false alarms (Section 7.1).
• With up to 1/3 of the peers subverted, the stealth
adversary fails. Above that, the probability of irrecov-
erable damage increases gradually (Section 7.2).
• A nuisance adversary whose goal is simply to raise an
alarm has to exert significant effort over a long period
(Section 7.3).
• An attrition adversary whose goal is to prevent con-
sensus long enough for random damage to corrupt the
AU will be detected before he succeeds (Section 7.4).
7.1 Rate of false positives
Without an adversary, but with peers subject to random
damage they do not themselves detect, Figure 2 shows that
false alarms occur rarely. We simulate 20 years with every
peer suffering random undetected damage at mean intervals
varying from 5 to 10 years. Over 20 runs, we show the
minimum, average and maximum total rates of false alarms
raised at any peer in the entire system. With undetected
damage at each peer every 5 years, in the worst case the
average rate of false alarms in the system is 44 days, that is,
every 44 days some peer in the system sees an alarm. The
average peer sees an alarm once in about 120 years.
The rates of random undetected damage we simulate are
vastly higher than we observe in practice. Our peers typ-
ically lack reliability features such as ECC memory. Yet
in over 200 machine-years of the test deployment, we have
observed only one peer in which such errors affected polls.
Our simulations below assume this 1 in 200 probability of a
random undetected error per peer year.
7.2 Stealth Adversary
We show that the probability of a stealth adversary caus-
ing irrecoverable damage remains very low even for an initial
subversion of 1/3, and then increases gradually. Conserva-
tively, we deem damage irrecoverable if the initially sub-
verted (malign) and the damaged (loyal) peers form more
than 50% of the population. For the following simulations,
the adversary has infinite CPUs and as many NICs as neces-
sary to gain the maximum possible foothold ratio during 20
years of lurking. We vary churn from 2% to 10% and sub-
version from 1% to 40%. For every initial subversion and
churn factor, we run all compatible attack phases lasting up
to 10 years for all foothold ratios (40% and up) achieved
during the lurking runs (see Section 6.3.1). We run every
combination of parameters described above with 20 different
random seeds.
Figure 3 shows the minimum time taken by the lurking
phase to a foothold. The x axis shows the proportion of
total peers that are initially subverted. The y axis shows the
minimum time it takes the adversary to deteriorate the loyal
peers’ reference lists to various foothold ratios. Note that
runs with low subversion levels do not achieve foothold ratios
of 20% or more in 20 years. Also, the adversary can achieve
greater footholds when loyal peers use a lower churn factor.
This is because reference list churning resists the attempts
of the adversary to create a foothold in reference lists that is
much greater than the initial subversion he has obtained; less
churning means that the adversary can expand his foothold
more effectively.
Figure 4 shows how long the attack phase lasts before it
is detected. For each foothold ratio at the beginning of the
attack phase, we show the quartile distribution of times until
the first alarm. Some runs do not raise an inconclusive poll
alarm; they damage very few loyal peers. At the top of each
distribution is the percentage of such runs.
Figure 5 illustrates that the adversary must subvert a sig-
nificant number of loyal peers to change the AU irrecover-
ably for a churn factor of 10%; the initial subversion need be
lower for lower churn factors. The graph shows the distribu-
tion of the maximum proportion of bad replicas (including
those at subverted peers) caused as a function of initial sub-
version. The number above the distribution shows the time
in years needed to achieve the maximum damage with that
subversion. For example, with a 10% churn factor and an
initial subversion of 8%, the adversary takes more than 16
years of lurking to achieve a 40% foothold ratio and another
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Figure 4: The time from the start of the attack phase (in the stealth strategy) to the time of detection, for
different starting reference list foothold ratios. Ticks split the value distributions into quartiles. Percentages
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Figure 5: The percentage of bad replicas as a function of initial subversion. Ticks split the value distributions
into quartiles. Numbers above the distributions show the time in years needed by the adversary to cause
maximum damage. The diagonal line shows the damage due to peer subversion. The horizontal line shows
the threshold for irrecoverable damage.
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Figure 6: Worst-case increase in the probability of accessing a bad replica due to the attack, as a function of
initial subversion. Each curve corresponds to runs with a different foothold ratio at the start of the attack
phase. We only show values for subversions at which the adversary did not cause irrecoverable damage. We
show graphs for churn factors of 4, 6, 8 and 10%.
year of attacking to damage an additional 0.8% of the repli-
cas. As subversion increases, the adversary is able to damage
more loyal peers. With a 10% churn factor and up to 34%
subversion, the adversary does not cause irrecoverable dam-
age; at 35% subversion and above he succeeds in no more
than 12% of runs (see the 10% churn curve of Figure 8).
Figure 6 summarizes the effect on readers of attacks, iso-
lating the benefit that the adversary obtains with the strat-
egy from what he is given through the initial subversion. We
omit subversions for which irrecoverable damage is possible;
in those cases, the transient effect of the attack on readers
is irrelevant compared to the permanent loss of content that
the adversary causes.
On the x axis, we show the initial subversion. On the
y axis, we show the worst-case probability (due to the at-
tack) that a reader of the AU finds a damaged copy, i.e., the
expected value of the maximum fraction of damaged (not
initially subverted) AUs during the lurk and attack phases.
We graph a curve for each foothold at which the adversary
starts the attack phase, and we show a graph for each of
churn factors 4, 6, 8 and 10% . Interestingly, the adver-
sary’s best strategy is not to lurk for as long as possible:
readers are most likely to see a bad AU when he lurks up to
a foothold ratio of 50% at 10% churn; lurking less results in
weaker attack phases; lurking more means that peers supply
readers with good AUs for longer. This behavior is consis-
tent also for the mean probability (not shown). This “best”
foothold ratio is lower for lower churn factors, e.g., a 40%
foothold is best for the 4% churn factor. This is because
the system’s resistance to the adversary’s attempts to gain
a foothold in reference lists is weaker when churn is lower,
i.e., when fewer friends are brought into the reference list to
temper the adversary’s biased statistics.
Note also that for a churn of 10%, despite an initial subver-
sion of more than 1/3 of the peers (34%) by an adversary
with unlimited computational power, unlimited identities,
complete knowledge of the protocol parameters and an at-
tack lasting more than a year, the probability of a reader
accessing a bad AU is only 2.7 percentage points greater
than it is immediately after the initial subversion. The sys-
tem resists further damage effectively despite the subversion
of 1/3 of its peers.
In Figure 7, we explore how different churn factors affect
the worst-case probability of accessing a bad AU, over all
foothold ratios at the start of the attack phase. Thus the
curve for the 10% churn factor is the upper envelope of Fig-
ure 6. We only show data for subversions at which irrecov-
erable damage does not occur; this eliminates runs with 0
and 2% churn factors, as well as other points above a critical
subversion (e.g., 23% for 4% churn). The graph shows that
increasing the churn factor raises the initial subversion the
adversary needs before he can cause irrecoverable damage,
and reduces the probability of accessing a bad AU replica.
Finally, Figure 8 shows that churning the reference list
is an invaluable tool in thwarting the adversary. On the
y axis, we show the probability that the adversary causes
irrecoverable damage in our simulations, given different ini-
tial subversions on the x axis, one curve per churn factor.
Increasing the churn factor increases the initial subversion
needed to make irrecoverable damage possible. Beyond this
critical subversion level, the system suffers a gradual increase
in the probability of irrecoverable damage. Note, however,
that even with low churn factors and up to 40% initial sub-
version, the adversary still has a 37% chance of being caught
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before he causes irrecoverable damage.
7.3 Nuisance Adversary
Figure 9 shows the effect of a nuisance adversary with 1 to
128 nodes-worth of computing effort available who subverts
1 to 64 peers then attempts to raise an alarm at any peer.
The simulation ends after 3 years or at the first such alarm.
The error bars show minimum, average and maximum times
to the first alarm, over 12 runs per data point, with some
attacks not generating an alarm in the first 3 years.
If the nuisance adversary subverts only a few peers, irre-
spective of his computing resource, he takes about 6 months
to raise an alarm, or (see Figure 2) the equivalent of a ran-
dom damage rate of once every 6-7 years. If he takes over
a large number of peers, irrespective of his computing re-
source the alarm happens quickly. This seems to be suitable
behavior, in that large compromises should be detected.
7.4 Attrition Adversary
Figure 10 shows the increase in the average inter-poll time
at loyal peers as a function of the effort expended by the at-
trition adversary. Without sufficient resources, he has little
effect on the system. If he can deploy sufficient resources,
in our case about 60 machines, he can prevent polls from
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Figure 10: Effect of the attrition adversary in in-
creasing mean time between polls as a function of
his effort. The y axis is in logarithmic scale.
reaching quorum and is detected after 3 average inter-poll
intervals (9 months), which is much less than half any rea-
sonable mean time between random undetected damage at
a peer. Any damage accumulated can therefore be repaired
after the response to the alarm suppresses the attack.
If the attrition adversary with few resources focuses his
attention on a single peer he can cause it to raise an alarm
after about 9 months. This might be an effective way to
deny service; further work is needed to prevent it.
8. RELATED WORK
In common with the Byzantine-fault-tolerance (BFT) lit-
erature (e.g., [5], [7], [24], [30]), our voting protocol derives
an apparent prevailing opinion among a set of peers, some
of whom are malicious. There are many differences; our
population size is too large for BFT’s global communica-
tion, we degrade gradually rather than mask the effects of
failure or attack, and because we cannot assume an abso-
lute upper bound on the malicious peers’ resources we have
to consider the possibility of being overwhelmed. We use
sampling to avoid global knowledge or communication, rate-
limiters to prevent our adversary’s unlimited resources from
overwhelming the system quickly, and integrated intrusion
detection to preempt unrecoverable failure.
Our work has similarities with the anti-entropy protocol
forming part of Bimodal Multicast [4], a reliable multicast
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protocol in which peers send digests of their message histo-
ries to randomly chosen other peers. Peers receiving these
messages can detect omissions and request repairs from the
peer that sent the digest. The system’s name comes from its
bimodal distribution of delivery probability, which is simi-
lar to our distribution of poll results absent an attack. As
in our case, it exploits the properties of random graphs. As
the authors acknowledge, the lack of voting among the peers
leaves the anti-entropy protocol vulnerable to malign peers.
Our work also shares a goal with some of the first peer-to-
peer systems including Freenet [8], FreeHaven [15], and the
Eternity Service [2], namely to make it hard for a powerful
adversary to damage or destroy a document in the system.
The other key goal of these systems is to provide anonymity
for both publishers and readers of content, which we do not
share. It would make our system both illegal and unwork-
able, since we often preserve content that must be paid for.
Several studies have proposed a persistent, peer-to-peer
storage service including Intermemory [6], CFS [10], Ocean-
store [23], PAST [34], and Tangler [38]. Some (e.g., Ocean-
store) implement access control by encrypting the data and
thus do not solve our preservation problem, merely reduc-
ing it from preserving and controlling access to the con-
tent, to preserving and controlling access to the encryption
key. Others (e.g., PAST) implement access control based
on long-term secrets and smartcards or a key management
infrastructure. Neither is appropriate for our application.
Some (e.g., Intermemory) use cryptographic sharing to pro-
liferate n partial replicas, from any m < n of which the
file can be reconstituted. Others (e.g., PAST) replicate the
entire file, as we do, but do not allow control over where
the replicas are located. The goal of the LOCKSS system is
to allow librarians to take custody of the content to which
they subscribe. This requires that each library keep its own
copy of a document it has purchased, not share the load of
preserving a small number of copies.
Moore et al. [28] report interesting measurements on packet-
level denial-of-service attacks, types, and frequencies. For
example, most attacks are relatively short with 90% lasting
less than an hour. Rarely do such attacks span multiple
days. The relevance of this data to application-level denial-
of-service attacks is questionable, but our simulated attacks
require attention spans from the attackers several orders of
magnitude longer.
9. FUTURE WORK
We have two immediate goals: to deploy an implementa-
tion to our test sites, and to improve the protocol’s perfor-
mance against the attrition adversary. Before deployment,
we need to emulate the initial version’s handling of many
practical details, especially the “divide-and-conquer” search
for damage in an AU formed of many documents. Our sim-
ulated attrition adversary can currently prevent 1000 loyal
peers from running polls with about 60 malign nodes fully
committed to the attack. We have identified several avenues
for improving this inadequate performance, including using
additional peer state to identify attrition attacks and im-
proving the economic model to account for commitment of
time as well as effort [33].
Our current adversary model starts by making a propor-
tion of the peers malign; these peers remain malign for the
duration. Other peers may have their AUs damaged by an
attack, but they remain loyal for the duration. We need to
enhance the model to account for peers becoming malign
as they fall victim to vulnerabilities, and becoming loyal as
their administrators patch and repair them.
We have analyzed potential adversaries from two points
of view, their goals and the opportunities offered them by
their roles in protocol implementations. But we have yet to
show that our simulated adversary strategies are optimal.
We have shown that the system’s cost structure and other
parameters can be set appropriately for a realistic applica-
tion, but we have yet to explore alternate cost structures
and parameter values, or how to set them optimally. These
investigations will be aided when we are able to validate the
simulator against a deployed implementation.
10. WHY LOTS OF COPIES KEEP STUFF
SAFE
Storage alone will not solve the problem of digital preser-
vation. Academic materials have many enemies beyond nat-
ural bit rot: ideologies, governments, corporations, and in-
adequate budgets. It is essential that sound storage and
administration practices are complemented with the formu-
lation of communities that act together to thwart attacks
that are too strong or too extrinsic for reliable storage to
withstand.
In a novel thrust towards this goal, we have built a new
opinion poll protocol for LOCKSS, applying the design prin-
ciples in Section 2:
Cheap storage is unreliable. We replicate all persistent
storage across peers, audit replicas regularly and repair any
damage they find. Peer state is soft and rebuilt by normal
system operations if it is lost.
No long-term secrets. Our peers need keep secrets only
for the duration of a single poll. Without long-term secrets
attackers may spoof the identity of peers, but by requiring
evidence of recent effort we reduce the time during which
stability of identity matters to a few poll durations, and we
use short-term secrets to reduce spoofing during a poll.
Use inertia. We provide the system with an analog of
inertia by making all of its operations inherently expensive
and by limiting the rate of possible change in the system.
Because even the operations involved in failure are inher-
ently time-consuming, it is very hard for attackers to over-
whelm the system quickly, which provides time for humans
to prevent the attack from resulting in catastrophic failure.
Avoid third-party reputation. Third-party reputation is
vulnerable to slander and subversion of previously reliable
peers, especially in the absence of strong identities. Further,
we do not use accumulated evidence of a peer’s good behav-
ior. We instead require evidence of substantial recent effort
to allow a peer to influence the outcome of a poll.
To the extent to which a peer does maintain a history of
another peer’s behavior, that history is very simple, derived
from direct observation, and acts only as a hint. The system
survives the loss or corruption of this memory at peers.
Reduce predictability. The reference lists are the only
mechanism by which an attacker can damage a loyal peer’s
AU. Churning deprives the attacker of complete control of
them, slowing an attack and increasing the risk of detection.
Intrusion detection is intrinsic. Random damage to indi-
vidual replica AUs stored by peers is incoherent, resulting
in polls that are either landslide agreement or landslide dis-
agreement. An attacker attempting to change a preserved
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AU requires coherent damage to replica AUs across peers,
which results in polls that are more closely contested. Con-
tested polls, and thus coherent damage, raise an inconclusive
poll alarm and lead to detection of the attack.
Assume a strong adversary. We allow for an adversary
who can call on unlimited computing resources and unlim-
ited identities, who can subvert or spoof a large proportion
of the peers, and who has information about the parameters
of each poll that a real attacker would be unlikely to possess.
11. CONCLUSION
We have shown that a combination of massive replication,
rate limitation, inherent intrusion detection and costly op-
erations can produce a peer-to-peer system with remarkable
ability to resist attacks by some extraordinarily powerful ad-
versaries over decades. Its lack of dependence on long-term
secrets and stable identities blocks many of the paths by
which systems are typically attacked. We believe that this
protocol will allow us to scale the deployed LOCKSS sys-
tem to production levels in 2004. Although we developed
the new LOCKSS protocol for an application with unusual
characteristics, especially its goal of preventing change, we
nonetheless believe that the concepts and principles under-
lying the protocol will be useful in the design of other long-
term large-scale applications operating in hostile environ-
ments.
The LOCKSS project is hosted by SourceForge, where
the current implementation can be obtained. The Narses
simulator will be available from SourceForge shortly. Both
carry BSD-style Open Source licenses.
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APPENDIX
A. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
We use a memory-bound function (MBF) scheme due to
Dwork et al. [17]. Here we briefly describe it and compute
appropriate costs to impose on poll initiation and voting.
Recall that S is the size of the AU in cache lines.
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A.1 Overview of a Memory Bound Function
Scheme
The goal of the MBF is to cause the prover of the nec-
essary effort to incur a number C of cache misses and thus
RAM accesses. If each of these takes t seconds, the prover
must have used C · t seconds on a real computer. Memory
bandwidths vary significantly less among commonly avail-
able architectures than CPU speeds do, making MBFs su-
perior in provable effort to the CPU-bound functions previ-
ously proposed [12, 18].
The scheme we use has two adjustable parameters, the
cost, l, of verifying an effort proof and the ratio, E, between
l and the cost of constructing the proof. We measure all
costs in cache misses, so a proof costs E · l cache misses to
construct and l cache misses to verify.
Dwork et al. describe an MBF scheme that uses an incom-
pressible fixed public data set T larger than any cache it is
likely to meet. In our case, a gigabyte would be practical.
An effort prover who must expend effort E · l is given as
challenge a nonce n (so that the prover cannot reuse older
effort proofs) and the values of E and l. In response, the
prover must perform a series of pseudo-random walks in the
table T . For each walk, the prover starts from a different
position s of his choosing and computes a one-way value
A based on n, s and the encountered elements of table T .
The walk is dependent on n and s; it is constructed so that
the number of encountered elements is l, and fetching each
encountered element causes an L1 cache miss. Each walk,
therefore, causes l cache misses.
The prover stops when he computes a value A that has 0
bits in its least significant log
2
E positions. With the given
MBF scheme, it is expected the prover will try E walks with
different starting positions s before finding an appropriate
starting position s′; this costs the prover C = E · l cache
misses.
The s′ that yielded the appropriate A is the effort proof.
The verifier need only perform the random walk on T start-
ing with the n he chose and the s′ sent by the prover; this
costs the verifier V = l cache misses. If the resulting value
A from this walk has the proper 0-bits in its last log
2
E
positions, the verifier accepts the effort proof as valid.
We first describe how we use the MBF scheme in the con-
struction and verification of votes. We then describe how
we impose costs on vote construction and verification and
how we choose appropriate parameters for each of these.
A.2 Vote Construction and Verification
A.2.1 Construction
As described in Sections 4.1.5 and 4.1.11, vote construc-
tion is divided into rounds. Each round consists of two
parts: the construction of an MBF proof of effort and the
hashing of a portion of the document. The portion of the
document hashed in each round has twice as many content
blocks as the previous round, 2i−1 blocks in round i, or
r = ⌈log
2
(B + 1)⌉ rounds for a content of B blocks (we
explain why in Section A.3).
We design vote construction in a way that ensures the
order of computation for each stage; specifically, we wish
to ensure that voters cannot precompute or parallelize dif-
ferent stages of the construction of a vote (although indi-
vidual stages of MBF proof construction may be paralleliz-
able [17]).
A vote contains the MBF proofs and content hashes com-
puted during the two stages of every vote construction round.
We denote the list of MBF effort proofs for the r rounds of
vote construction as [s1, . . . , sr] and the list of the corre-
sponding content hashes as [H1, . . . ,Hr].
At round i, the MBF proof computation stage takes as in-
put the nonce ni (we explain how we build this nonce below)
and the proof parameters Ei and li, returning the proof si
and the output value Ai (see Section A.1). This is followed
by the content hash stage of round i, which computes the
hash h(si‖Ai‖content − block i), where ‖ denotes bit string
concatenation, h is our cryptographic hash function, and
content − block i denotes the portion of the content that we
hash during round i (to be determined in Section A.3). The
output of the hashing stage is the hash value Hi.
Because the proof and output of the MBF proof compu-
tation are included in the input to the cryptographic hash
function h, the vote constructor cannot precompute Hi be-
fore having determined the MBF proof si and the corre-
sponding output value Ai. We include both si and Ai in
the hash (as opposed to only the proof si) to ensure that
it is hard for the vote constructor to precompute Hi values
for all possible sis. Instead, si and Ai together come from a
large enough range of possible values that precomputing all
likely hashes Hi by brute-force is intractable.
The nonce ni input into the MBF proof effort compu-
tation of the i-th round must be such that precomputing
an effort proof for round i before the MBF proof effort
computation or content hashing stage of round i − 1 is in-
tractable. For the first round of vote construction, n1 must
be such that the voter cannot start computing its vote un-
til it receives the challenge of the poll initiator. As a re-
sult, n1 = h(challenge‖pollID‖voterAddress ), and for i > 1,
ni = h(si−1‖Ai−1‖Hi−1‖challenge‖pollID‖voterAddress ).
A.2.2 Verification
Vote verification is also divided into rounds, with MBF
and hashing stages in each round. The initiator, guided by
the list of MBF effort proofs and hashes contained in the
Vote it receives, verifies the computations of the voter using
its local copy of the document.
At round i, the MBF proof verification stage takes as in-
put the nonce ni (see Section A.2.1), the proof parameters
Ei and li, and the proof si (included in the message) and
constructs the output value Ai (see Section A.1). If this
value ends in log
2
Ei 0-bits, the verifier accepts the effort
proof. Otherwise, the verifier deems the vote invalid.
If the verifier has yet to deem the vote disagreeing, it
proceeds with the content hashing stage of the vote verifi-
cation. Specifically, it computes the hash of its appropriate
local content blocks: H ′i = h(si‖Ai‖content − block i). If the
resulting hash H ′i is different from the value Hi contained
in the vote, the verifier deems the vote disagreeing and only
verifiers MBF efforts in the remaining rounds.
Note that, as with vote construction, the verifier sets n1
using the challenge, poll identifier and the voter’s identity,
and all subsequent ni’s using, again, the challenge, poll iden-
tifier and voter’s identity, as well as the effort proof si−1
from the vote, the value Ai−1 computed during the previ-
ous round’s MBF stage, and the voter’s hash Hi−1 from the
vote.
A.3 Choice Of Voting Effort Sizes
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Let CMBF (i) and VMBF (i) be the costs of the i-th round
MBF construction and verification, respectively. If there
are b cache lines in a content block, then the i-th round
hashing costs H(i) = 2i−1b and is the same in construc-
tion and in verification. Then, round i vote construction
costs Cv(i) = CMBF (i) + H(i) and vote verification costs
Vv(i) = VMBF (i) + H(i). Finally, overall voting operations
cost Cv =
∑r
i=1 Cv(i) for construction, and Vv =
∑r
i=1 Vv(i)
for verification. The cost to verify a disagreeing vote may
be less, since hashing stops after the first disagreeing block.
We require (Section 4.2.1) that the cost of constructing a
vote be greater or equal than the cost of verifying that vote,
even if the vote is corrupt or malformed, in that in round i
either its MBF verification fails or its content hash disagrees.
We examine the four cases in which our requirements must
hold: valid agreeing vote, valid disagreeing vote, a vote that
contains garbage from the i-th MBF proof onwards, and a
vote that contains garbage from the i-th content hash on-
wards. We set Ei = E, constant for all rounds, and set li to
the size of the content block in each round, that is li = 2
i−1b.
Different choices for li and variable E for each voting round
are possible.
A.3.1 Valid Agreeing Vote
The verifier performs both the MBF and content hashing
components of every verification round. As a result, we must
establish that Cv ≥ Vv:
Cv ≥ Vv
⇔
r∑
i=1
Cv(i) ≥
r∑
i=1
Vv(i)
⇔
r∑
i=1
CMBF (i) ≥
r∑
i=1
VMBF (i)
⇔
r∑
i=1
Eli ≥
r∑
i=1
li
⇔ E ≥ 1 (7)
A.3.2 Valid Disagreeing Vote
If we satisfy the inequality 7 for agreeing votes, we fulfill
the requirements for disagreeing votes, because if the content
hash disagrees in round i, no further hashing is performed.
Thus the cost of verifying in this case is no greater than Vv.
A.3.3 Invalid i-th MBF Proof
If the vote’s MBF verification fails in round i but not
before, its constructor must have performed at least the ef-
fort of the preceding rounds: Cv,invMBF (i) =
∑i−1
k=1
Cv(k).
The verifier’s effort ceases after the MBF verification of
round i, and costs no more than Vv,invMBF (i) = VMBF (i) +∑i−1
k=1
Vv(k). The economic requirements of our solution im-
pose that Cv,invMBF (i) ≥ Vv,invMBF (i):
Cv,invMBF (i) ≥ Vv,invMBF (i)
⇔
i−1∑
k=1
Cv(k) ≥ VMBF (i) +
i−1∑
k=1
Vv(k)
⇔
i−1∑
k=1
(Cv(k)− Vv(k)) ≥ VMBF (i)
⇔
i−1∑
k=1
(CMBF (k)− VMBF (k)) ≥ VMBF (i)
⇔
i−1∑
k=1
(Elk − lk) ≥ li
⇔ b(E − 1)
i−1∑
k=1
2i−1 ≥ b2i−1
⇔ (E − 1)(2i−1 − 1) ≥ 2i−1
⇔ E(2i−1 − 1) ≥ 1
⇔ E ≥
1
2i−1 − 1
(8)
This requires that 2i−1 > 1, which holds for all i > 1.
For the first voting round (i = 1), the inequality is un-
satisfiable. Even if the malicious voter sends garbage, the
verifier must perform some effort, the first round’s MBF
verification, to detect it. Sending garbage costs the verifier
VMBF (1) = b. But to be invited to send garbage, the mali-
cious peer had to be in the initiator’s reference list, which
cost at least Cv = (E+1)S. Sending garbage squanders this
effort, (E + 1) times the hash cost of the entire content, to
impose a blocks’ worth of cache misses.
A.3.4 Invalid i-th Content Hash
If the i-th round content hash fails to agree, the vote is
certainly disagreeing, but may still be valid. The verifier
deems it invalid only when the next round MBF verification
fails. In this case, the vote construction must have cost the
voter at least Cv,invHash (i) = CMBF (i)+
∑i−1
k=1
Cv(k) and the
vote verification costs the verifier Vv,invHash (i) = VMBF (i +
1) +
∑i
k=1
Vv(k). We require Cv,invHash (i) ≥ Vv,invHash(i):
Cv,invHash (i) ≥ Vv,invHash (i)
⇔ CMBF (i) +
i−1∑
k=1
Cv(k) ≥ VMBF (i+ 1) +
i∑
k=1
Vv(k)
⇔ Eb2i−1 +
i−1∑
k=1
(Cv(k)− Vv(k)) ≥ b2
i + Vv(i)
⇔ Eb2i−1 +
i−1∑
k=1
(Elk − lk) ≥ b2
i + 2b2i−1
⇔ Eb2i−1 + (E − 1)b
i−1∑
k=1
2k−1 ≥ 4b2i−1
⇔ E2i−1 + (E − 1)(2i−1 − 1) ≥ 4 · 2i−1
⇔ E(2 · 2i−1 − 1) ≥ 5 · 2i−1 − 1
⇔ E ≥
5 · 2i−1 − 1
2 · 2i−1 − 1
(9)
provided that 2i > 1, which is true for all i > 0.
A.3.5 Choice for E
Any choice of E that satisfies Inequalities 7, 8 and 9 for
i > 1 is appropriate given our economic requirements. Note
also that different choices for li and even variable E for
each voting round are also possible. For our choice of li,
E = 4 is the minimum value for E. Higher values might be
desirable for smaller content sizes to make rate limitation
more effective. If S is the size of the content in cache lines
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and E = 4, the cost of constructing a vote is Cv = 5S, the
cost of verifying an agreeing vote Vv = 2S and the cost of
verifying a disagreeing vote Vvd = S.
A.4 Designation Of Poll Initiation Effort Sizes
We want the cost Cp of poll initiation per invitee to be at
least the induced cost on the invitee:
Cp ≥ Vp + Cv (10)
where Vp is the cost of verifying the poll initiation effort.
Based on the analysis of the voting costs above, this means
Eplp ≥ lp + 5S
⇔ (Ep − 1)lp ≥ 5S (11)
One choice for the MBF parameters is Ep = 4 and lp =
(5/3)S. The poll initiator must expend Cp = (20/3)S cache
misses per invitee, and each invitee must spend Vp = (5/3)S
cache misses to verify the invitation.
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